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Losing Your Head in the Washer –
Why the Brainwashing Defense
Can Be a Complete Defense in
Criminal Cases
Rebecca Emory
Introduction
“Brainwashing” is not a new concept, not even in the legal world.
In the field of psychology, the term has been used over time in the
studies of prisoners of war and religious cults.1 In the field of law,
individual criminal defendants have tried, though unsuccessfully, to use
brainwashing as a criminal defense.2 Nevertheless, it is still disputed
whether brainwashing should play a role at trial and, if so, how big a role
this should be. Some have proposed that brainwashing should only be
used as a mitigating factor in criminal cases.3 However, when examined
against other defenses, such as duress and insanity, an argument can be
made that brainwashing could be as successful and complete a defense to
a crime as these other defenses.
Furthermore, an argument can be made that a potential
brainwashing defense should fall, though disputed, under the insanity
defense. Both defenses have similarities. Brainwashing can be
categorized as a mental defect or disease and it can be argued that the
defendant cannot distinguish between right and wrong when he or she is
committing the act.4 Like insanity, brainwashing should also be
categorized as an excuse and not a justification for committing a crime.
The difference between a justification and an excuse is crucial. Though
a defendant is acquitted in both instances, “claims of excuse concede that


J.D., Pace University School of Law, 2010.
1. Richard Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward a Defense
Theory for the Coercively Persuaded (“Brainwashed”) Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1
(1978-1979).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
3. See Ida-Gaye Warburton, The Commandeering of Free Will: Brainwashing as a
Legitimate Defense, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 73 (2003).
4. James Dao, Mental Health Experts Call Sniper Defendant Brainwashed, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at A38.
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the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution of the act to the
actor.”5 For example, a crime committed in self-defense is “both legally
and morally correct” and is therefore deemed a justification.6 However,
an excuse “is not justified, since it should not be encouraged, but is still
exempt from criminal liability due to society‟s understanding of the
grave situation in which the actor has found himself.”7 The courts do not
concentrate on the specific act done by the perpetrator, but rather focus
“on the circumstances of the act and the actor‟s personal capacity to
avoid either an intentional wrong or the taking of an excessive risk.”8
Insanity is rarely used as a defense at trial because most juries are
reluctant to believe it.9 Yet, it is still an available defense. The
brainwashing defense has not yet been successful; however, this does not
mean it should not be included as a valid defense. The success rate of a
defense should not guide the implementation of it. In the past, society
and society‟s morals have called for certain legal defenses based on
scientific theories, even in circumstances where the scientific community
was reluctant to acknowledge them.10
There have been two highly publicized cases presenting the
brainwashing defense: the Patty Hearst case involving a kidnapped
heiress who robbed banks with her kidnappers,11 and the D.C. sniper
case, involving a teenager claiming to be “indoctrinated” into killing
random people from his car.12 In both cases the defense failed for
various reasons.13 Nevertheless, these cases provide stepping stones for
a potential brainwashing defense in the future. Defendants who have
allegedly been brainwashed are often categorized as victims rather than
perpetrators.14 “Sentencing can promote beneficial effects for society by
deterring future harms and incapacitating only those who would visit
such harms upon the polity.”15 Yet, in cases where the defendant has
5. Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Torturing Debate on Torture, 29 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 1, 40 (2008).
6. Boaz Sangero, In Defense of Self-Defence in Criminal Law; and on Killing in
Self-Defence—A Reply to Fiona Leverick, 44 No. 6 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN 4 (2008).
7. Id.
8. Wattad, supra note 5, at 40.
9. Fox Butterfield, Dispute Over Insanity Defense Is Revived in Murder Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at A10.
10. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 24.
11. United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
12. Mike M. Ahlers, Jury Convicts Malvo of Sniper Murder, CNN LAW CENTER,
Dec. 19, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/18/sprj.dcsp.malvo.trial/index.html.
13. See infra Part III.C-D.
14. Delgado, supra note 1, at 7.
15. O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment,
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raised the insanity defense, deterrence is shown to be ineffective.16
Besides retribution, there is no basis for imprisonment.17 This is also
true in brainwashing cases. As in insanity cases, instead of putting
brainwashed defendants behind bars, they should enter a treatment
program for rehabilitation. Many states have implemented statutes that
will place defendants, who have been acquitted by reason of insanity, in
medical or psychiatric hospitals. For instance, the “detention under D.C.
Code § 24-301(d) is not punitive but rather serves a two-fold purpose: (1)
to protect the public and the subject, and (2) to afford a place and a
procedure to treat and, if possible, to rehabilitate the subject.”18 As a
result, these statutes should also apply to brainwashed defendants.
This note will demonstrate how brainwashing can be a complete
defense to a crime and therefore should be adopted into the Model Penal
Code under the insanity defense. Part I provides a brief introduction to
the background of brainwashing and the closely related Stockholm
Syndrome. Part II analyzes two existing defenses, duress and insanity, in
which scholars have tried to place the brainwashing defense. Further,
Part II also provides an analysis of two famous cases, the Patty Hearst
case19 and the D.C. sniper case,20 which have both introduced the
brainwashing defense at trial. Part III presents the elements of the
brainwashing defense and explains why the Model Penal Code should
adopt it. In addition, Part III offers the existing criticism to the
brainwashing defense. Finally, Part IV concludes that the criticisms are
outweighed by the benefits of the brainwashing defense.
I. Background
A.

Brainwashing

To understand the concept of “brainwashing,” it is necessary to
understand where it comes from and what it actually means. Edward
Hunter, a journalist for the Chicago Tribune, first introduced the idea of
“brainwashing” in 1951.21 In response to the behavior of American
Prisoners in China and North Korea, Hunter tried to explain why these
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1314 (2007).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Collins v. Cameron, 377 F.2d 945, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
19. United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
20. Mohammed v. State, 934 A.2d 1059 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009).
21. Warburton, supra note 3, at 76.
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“American prisoners of war (“POWs”) converted to Communism . . . as
a result of coercion.”22 Though the threat of force was present, it was the
isolation and mind techniques that were used to “brainwash” these
prisoners.23 Psychologist Robert Jay Lifton, through his studies of
POWs, found that there were several steps in brainwashing.24 Later
psychologists reviewed Lifton‟s work and characterized the steps as
three distinct stages: “breaking down the self, introducing the possibility
of salvation, and rebuilding the self.”25 The first stage deals with selfdoubt. The indoctrinator or agent attacks a person‟s identity until the
“breaking point” which leads to a complete “identity crises.”26 During
the second stage, the agent attaches the person‟s feeling of guilt to his old
belief system.27 This leads to a “psychological rejection of his former
identity.”28 During the third stage, the agent rebuilds the person‟s belief
system and gives him a new identity.29
According to Lifton, “the process which gave rise to the name”
brainwashing was “the official Chinese Community program of szuhsiang kai–tsao . . . .”30 Translated, “szu-hsiang kai-tsao” means
“„ideological remodeling,‟ „ideological reform.‟”31 Today, common
synonyms for “brainwashing” are “coercive persuasion” and “thought
reform,” which define the “forcible indoctrination process designed to
induce the subject to abandon existing political, religious, or social
beliefs in favor of a rigid system imposed by the indoctrinator.”32
Moreover, the indoctrinator achieves his goal by “isolation, physiological
depletion, assertions of authority, guilt manipulation, peer pressure, and
cognitive dissonance.”33
Although the American Psychological Association (“APA”) has
declined to rule “brainwashing” as a scientific theory in regards to

22. Id.
23. Julia Layton, How Brainwashing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, May 10,
2006, http://people.howstuffworks.com/brainwashing.htm/printable.
24. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM
– A STUDY OF “BRAINWASHING” IN CHINA 65-85 (1961).
25. Layton, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. LIFTON, supra note 24, at 4.
31. Id.
32. Delgado, supra note 1, at n.1.
33. Id. at 2.
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religious cults,34 there have been experts who believe that
“brainwashing” is a legitimate theory.35 In the legal field, judges have
allowed experts to testify on the brainwashing defense, while still
instructing the jury that it is a controversial theory.36 Nevertheless, the
split in the scientific community undermines the brainwashing theory
and therefore also “undermines the validity and admissibility of research
on this issue.”37
B.

Stockholm Syndrome

A mental disease that is widely recognized in the scientific
community is the Stockholm Syndrome. In United States v. Chancey,
expert Dr. Ochberg “described the „Stockholm Syndrome‟ as a
psychological phenomenon whereby a hostage develops positive feelings
for his or her captor.”38 Further, he states “that the theory was ten years
old and in the developmental stage, but was accepted by a large
percentage of psychiatrists who had been introduced to it.”39 Although
this syndrome was known beforehand, the name “Stockholm Syndrome”
originated in 1973 after a bank robbery that took place in Stockholm,
Sweden: “The two bank robbers held four hostages, three women and
one man, for the next 131 hours. The hostages were strapped with
dynamite and held in a bank vault until finally rescued.”40 Once rescued,
the hostages defended the robbers and were even afraid of the police.41 It
was evident that “the hostages had „bonded‟ emotionally with their
captors.”42
Experts and researchers have identified several symptoms and
behaviors attributed to the Stockholm Syndrome: “[p]ositive feelings by
34. Massimo Introvigne, “Liar, Liar”: Brainwashing, CESNUR and APA, CENTER
1998, http://www.cesnur.org/testi/gandow_eng.htm.
35. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass‟n, 762 P.2d 46, 54 (Cal. 1988) (“Some highly
respected authorities conclude brainwashing exists and is remarkably effective.”) (citing
ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM: A STUDY OF
“BRAINWASHING” IN CHINA (1961); EDGAR SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961)),
superseded on other grounds by statute.
36. Id. at 54.
37. Warburton, supra note 3, at 80.
38. United States v. Chancey, 715 F.2d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 1983).
39. Id.
40. Joseph M. Carver, Love and Stockholm Syndrome: The Mystery of Loving an
Abuser, MENTAL HEALTH MATTERS, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.mental-healthmatters.com/articles/article.php?artID=469.
41. Id.
42. Id.
FOR STUDIES ON NEW RELIGIONS,
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the victim toward the abuser/controller;”43 “[n]egative feelings by the
victim toward family, friends, or authorities trying to rescue/support
them or win their release;”44 “[s]upport of the abuser‟s reasons and
behaviors;”45 “[p]ositive feelings by the abuser toward the victim;”46
“[s]upportive behaviors by the victim, at times helping the abuser;”47 and
the “[i]nability to engage in behaviors that may assist in their release or
detachment.”48 In the Stockholm scenario, the hostages showed signs of
most of these symptoms. One of the female hostages even became
“engaged to one of the criminals and another developed a legal defense
fund to aid in their criminal defense fees.”49
The Stockholm Syndrome is closely related to the brainwashing
process. Most of the Stockholm Syndrome symptoms can be found in
brainwashed persons as well. In the famous Patty Hearst case,50 for
example, the defense tried to show that “Hearst had been „brainwashed‟
and suffered from what has been variously called the „Stockholm
Syndrome.‟”51 The idea was that as a result of brainwashing, Hearst
developed the Stockholm Syndrome.52 Furthermore, both the Stockholm
Syndrome and brainwashing are found in similar situations, specifically
in “hostage, prisoner, or abusive situations . . . .”53 The groups that are
mostly affected include abused children, battered and abused women,
prisoners of war, cult members, and criminal hostages.54
II. Duress, Insanity, and the Disputed Brainwashing Defense
When used, defense counsel has placed the brainwashing defense
under two different categories: the duress defense and the insanity
defense. For instance, in the Patty Hearst case, the defense counsel
stressed that brainwashing should fall within the duress defense because
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Douglas O. Linder, Patty Hearst Trial (1976), UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURIKANSAS
CITY
SCHOOL
OF
LAW,
2007,
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hearst/hearstdolaccount.html.
52. Id.
53. Carver, supra note 40.
54. Id.
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of the element of coercion.55 However, the defense counsel in the D.C.
sniper case used the insanity defense, arguing that the teenager was
brainwashed and could not distinguish between right and wrong.56
Although both approaches failed, the brainwashing defense is more
similar to the insanity defense because of the voluntary act that is
committed.
A.

Duress

Duress is a valid defense when the actor commits a crime because
“he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force
against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”57 Although
the actor commits the crime voluntarily and intentionally, he does not do
so by free will.58 Under duress, the actor does not choose to engage in a
certain behavior but is influenced by an “outside force.”59 Furthermore,
“where a defendant acts under duress, she lacks any semblance of a
meaningful choice. In that sense her choice is not free.”60 Therefore,
duress shows “the resemblance to [the] lack of mens rea . . . .”61
In addition, most jurisdictions include the element of “immediacy”
to the duress defense.62 Immediacy refers to the “threat of [bodily]
injury.”63 For example, “a veiled threat of future unspecified harm, as
the threat „to take care of‟, and „not to forget‟ is not the equivalent of an
immediate threat of death or severe bodily injury.”64 Immediacy poses a
55. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. at 870.
56. Dao, supra note 4.
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (2001). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2)-(4)
(2001), for further provisions under § 2.09 which limit the use of this defense. “(2) The
defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly places himself in a
situation in which it was probable that he would be subject to duress. The defense is also
unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever
negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. (3) It is not a defense
that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such
coercion as would establish a defense under this Section. . . . (4) When the conduct of the
actor would otherwise be justifiable under Section 3.02, this Section does not preclude
such defense.” Id.
58. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 24 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. United States v. Grainger, 239 F. App‟x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2007)
(distinguishing between necessity and duress).
60. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 23 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 24.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1984).
63. Id.
64. R.I. Recreation Ctr. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949)
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major problem for the brainwashing defense because the initial
immediate threat that existed may not be present at the time the crime is
executed.65 Coercion exists in almost any brainwashing scenario, usually
at its initiation.66 If a crime is committed during this period, a defendant
can use the duress defense in his favor. However, brainwashed
defendants tend to commit crimes after this initial stage, which can be
problematic for any defense based on duress.67
B.

Insanity

For the insanity defense to apply, it is necessary to prove that the
defendant was “insane” when he committed the crime. For the
brainwashing defense, it would therefore be irrelevant when the initial
coercion happened, as long as the defendant was still brainwashed when
he committed the crime. Yet, even the insanity defense has been
criticized in the past.68 Some states have gone so far as to abolish this
defense completely.69 Moreover, the insanity defense is only “employed
in fewer than [one] percent of criminal cases and is successful in only
about one quarter of these trials, according to a study by the American
Psychiatric Association.”70 Nevertheless, it is a valid defense in most
states. Most of these states still follow the 1843 definition of insanity. In
the English M’Naghten case, the bench ruled:
[T]he jurors ought to be told . . . that to establish a
defen[s]e on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.71
(emphasis added).
65. Delgado, supra note 1, at 8.
66. Id.
67. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
68. Butterfield, supra note 9.
69. Id. (stating that, by 1996, Montana, Utah and Idaho had abolished the insanity
defense); see also THINKING ABOUT THE INSANITY DEFENSE 6 (Ellsworth Lapham Fersch
ed., 2005) (stating that Montana, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, and Kansas have abolished the
insanity defense).
70. Butterfield, supra note 9.
71. M‟Naghten‟s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718722 (1843).
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This definition goes to the necessity “of understanding the nature and
quality” of the act.72 If a defendant does not understand that what he did
was wrong, there is no reason, under the theories of punishment, to
incarcerate him.
The Model Penal Code‟s definition of insanity is similar to the
M‟Naghten rule: Insanity is a legitimate defense when “[a] person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirement of law.”73 Furthermore, evidence of a
mental disease or defect “is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove
that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element
of the offense.”74 Although there might be an aspect of “free will” in the
person‟s actions, “it does show the absence of a „vicious will.‟”75
The main distinction between the duress and insanity defense is that
duress requires the element of coercion.76 Moreover, a jury is probably
more likely to believe that a defendant committed a crime under duress
than due to insanity.77 Jurors can relate better to a situation of duress
than insanity. For example, it is easy for a juror to imagine why
someone robbed a bank when another person threatened to kill him or his
family. However, it is more difficult to imagine that someone heard a
voice in his head that told him to rob a bank. Additionally, several issues
arise with the insanity defense. For example, the issue of legal versus
moral insanity has bothered courts in the past.78 It has also been difficult
to find an adequate definition for a “mental disease or defect.”79 “Most
courts seem to assume that „mental disease‟ for purposes of the insanity
defense is a legal, not a medical concept,”80 therefore the legal concept

72. Butterfield, supra note 9.
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001).
74. Id. § 4.02(1).
75. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 24 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
76. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09(1), 4.01(1) (2001).
77. See Steven K. Erickson, Mind Over Morality, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1555, 1561
(2007) (explaining that “the take-home message of the Hearst case is the calculated tactic
by the defense to pursue a duress claim instead of an insanity one presumably in the
hopes that the jury would better receive it”).
78. See, e.g., State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45 (N.J. 1963).
79. SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 895 (8th ed. 2007).
80. Id.
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should also guide its definition.
There are three different approaches as to what constitutes a “mental
disease.”81 These approaches include the McDonald v. United States
approach,82 the American Psychiatric Association approach,83 and the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) approach.84
The McDonald
approach states that a “mental disease or defect includes any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional
processes and substantially impairs behavior controls.”85 Under this
standard, brainwashing could be categorized as a mental disease.
Through certain brainwashing techniques, such as “isolation,
physiological depletion, assertions of authority, guilt manipulation, peer
pressure, and cognitive dissonance,”86 the indoctrinator shapes the mind
of his victim, which substantially affects his mental processes and
impairs behavior controls.
The second approach, by the American Psychiatric Association, is
more stringent. A “mental disease” is defined as “severely abnormal
mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person‟s
perception or understanding of reality and that are not attributable
primarily to the voluntary ingestion of alcohol or other psychoactive
substances.”87 It is unlikely that brainwashing would be considered a
mental disease under this standard because words, such as “severely” and
“grossly” are very high standards to meet. Nevertheless, since most
courts look at insanity from a legal perspective, this approach will
probably not be used that often.
The third approach, by the ABA, is similar to the McDonald
approach. A “mental disease” is defined as the “(i) impairments of mind,
whether enduring or transitory, or, (ii) mental retardation … which
substantially affected the mental or emotional processes of the defendant
at the time of the alleged offense.”88 Again, under this approach,
81. Id.
82. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (per
curiam).
83. KADISH, supra note 79, at 896 (citing Insanity Defense Workgroup, American
Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY
681, 681-88 (1980)).
84. Id. (citing ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: MENTAL HEALTH § 7-6.1(a)
(1983)).
85. McDonald, 312 F.2d at 851.
86. Delgado, supra note 1, at 2 (citations omitted).
87. KADISH, supra note 79, at 896 (citing Insanity Defense Workgroup, American
Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY
681, 681-88 (1980)).
88. ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: MENTAL HEALTH § 7-6.1(a) (1983).
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brainwashing would, most likely, be considered a mental disease. The
indoctrinator has impaired the brainwashed mind to the extent that the
person‟s mental processes have been substantially affected. It follows
naturally that being legally insane is enough to find that a defendant has
a mental disease or defect and, as a result, the McDonald or ABA
definition of “mental disease or defect” should be followed.
Consequently, the legal approach should also be adhered to for the other
elements of the defense, such as “wrong” and “insane.” For example,
courts have been struggling with the meaning of “wrong” in insanity
cases.89 The difference between morally wrong and legally wrong is
evident. Though some courts use morally wrong as a guideline,90 the
standard should be the same for all elements. Therefore, the “[i]nsanity
acquittal requires the defendant to be unaware that his conduct was
legally wrong.”91
Courts are reluctant to expand the idea of duress beyond the
immediate threat of harm. As previously mentioned, there are two
highly publicized cases that have used the brainwashing defense.
Though in both cases the defense ultimately failed, the case analyses will
demonstrate that linking brainwashing to the insanity defense makes
sense and can be successful in the future. In the Patty Hearst case, there
were indicia that she acted out of free will while committing the bank
robbery.92 Free will was deadly to the defense because her counsel
linked it to the duress defense. If the defense counsel had not invoked
brainwashing through duress, whether or not her actions constituted free
will would have been irrelevant. In the D.C. sniper case, there was
evidence that the teenager rejected his mentor‟s plan and even tried to
commit suicide.93 Showing signs of unwillingness undermines the idea
that the defendant could not distinguish between right and wrong. In
both cases, without this evidence, the brainwashing defense might have
proved successful.

89. Id. at 891; see also State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
90. See People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2000), superseded by statute, CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1054 (West 2010), as recognized in Verdin v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d
1250 (Cal. 2008).
91. KADISH, supra note 79, at 891.
92. Linder, supra note 51.
93. Dao, supra note 4.
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The Case of Patty Hearst

In the 1970s, the counsel for Patty Hearst drew attention to the
brainwashing defense in a highly publicized case. On February 4, 1974,
nineteen-year-old Patty Hearst, heiress to the Hearst Corporation,
“own[ing] a chain of newspapers, magazines and radio and TV
stations,”94 was kidnapped while in her Berkeley apartment in
California.95 The group responsible for her kidnapping was a radical
group known as the Symbionese Liberation Army (“SLA”).96 According
to the FBI, “the SLA wanted nothing less than to incite a guerrilla war
against the U.S. government and destroy what they called the „capitalist
state.‟”97 The SLA‟s goals were “closing prisons, ending monogamy,
and eliminating „all other institutions that have made and sustained
capitalism.‟”98 Patty Hearst was the perfect victim. She came from a
very affluent and influential family, and therefore the kidnapping brought
the desired media attention the SLA had hoped for.99
The SLA ordered the Hearst family to create a food donation
program.100 Hearst‟s father complied with the order and established the
“People in Need program and donated about $ [two] million.”101 Yet,
many problems arose and, in an audio message, Hearst condemned her
father‟s program.102 Additionally, her parents repeatedly tried to rescue
their daughter but two months after the initial kidnapping, Patty Hearst
“announced in a[nother] taped message that she had repudiated her
former lifestyle, and was determined to „stay and fight‟ beside her
captors . . . .”103 Instead of coming home, Hearst helped the SLA commit
many crimes, including robbing the Hibernia Bank in San Francisco,
94. Patty
Hearst
Profile,
CNN PEOPLE IN THE NEWS,
2001,
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/hearst/profile.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2009).
95. FBI Headline Archive, A Byte Out of History: The Patty Hearst Kidnapping,
Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/feb09/hearst_020409.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2009).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Linder, supra note 51.
99. FBI Headline Archive, supra note 95.
100. Linder, supra note 51 (“The food giveaway program was fraught with
problems. In some distribution locations, rioting and fraud hampered efforts, [sic] On
February 22 at a distribution site in West Oakland, rioting led to dozens of injuries and
arrests.”).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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which left three people injured.104 It took the police over one year until
they finally captured Hearst at her San Francisco apartment on
September 18, 1975.105
Though Hearst‟s mother categorized her daughter as a kidnapping
victim,106 Hearst was charged with “assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, and kidnapping.” 107
Hearst‟s main defense was duress.108 She maintained that she only
participated in the bank robbery “under the threat of bodily harm.”109
The court primarily focused on the issue of her “requisite intent” at the
time she committed the crimes.110 Hearst‟s defense counsel mainly
introduced evidence in form of expert testimony. For instance, counsel
called three psychiatrists who testified that she was forced to participate
in the robberies.111 Yet, Hearst took the stand as well. She testified to
“her atrocious and outrageous mistreatment in the closet where she was
kept blindfolded for days without relief.”112
Furthermore, the defense counsel claimed Hearst was
brainwashed.113 It tried to analogize brainwashing with duress by
showing that “Hearst was never a free agent or voluntary member of the
SLA, up to and including the time of her arrest.”114 Moreover, Hearst‟s
defense counsel tried to prove that Hearst had suffered from the
Stockholm Syndrome.115 In addition to the defense counsel‟s evidence,
expert “Dr. William Sargant, an English psychologist who interviewed
Hearst before her trial,” maintained that Hearst had been brainwashed by
her captors.116 He explained that Hearst was “broken” through “mental
cruelty, sensory deprivation, malnutrition, threats of death and injury . . .
.”117 He further stated that Hearst also experienced a “constant confusion

104. Id.
105. Linder, supra note 51.
106. Id.
107. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. at 1071. Altogether, “the State of California filed
nineteen criminal charges against the defendant . . . .” Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. In fact, requisite intent “became the sole issue of fact to be tried.” Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. FBI Headline Archive, supra note 95.
114. Linder, supra note 51.
115. Id. See discussion infra Part II.B. (exploring the definition of Stockholm
Syndrome).
116. Warburton, supra note 3, at 74.
117. Id.
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of affection and abuse . . . .”118
To rebut the defense counsel‟s evidence, the Government called its
own experts.119 It called two psychiatrists to testify that Hearst “was not
coerced but performed her acts voluntarily.”120 Furthermore, the
prosecution called “Tom Matthews, one of the men whom Ms. Hearst . . .
had kidnapped in Los Angeles . . . .”121 Matthews testified about
Hearst‟s “voluntary role” in the crimes and how she acknowledged to
him that she was participating freely.122 The prosecution also pointed out
Hearst‟s flawed testimony. For instance, Hearst claimed to be raped by
one of the SLA members; however, she also kept a gift from him in her
purse.123 Yet, the most influential testimony was by psychiatrist Joel
Fort. He testified to Hearst‟s character and her past behavior.124 Fort
asserted that Hearst previously lied in school, “engaged in sexual activity
at an early age, and experimented with drugs such as LSD.”125
Additionally, he stated that the SLA had many members who were
affluent and educated.126 As a result, Fort concluded that “Hearst would
find the SLA appealing.”127
In the end, the jury had to decide whom to believe. After
deliberation, the jury found Hearst guilty.128 On the issue of “requisite
intent,”129 the jury found that “Hearst had participated freely in the
robbery and did not believe the coercion theory presented by her
defense.”130 Hearst received a prison sentence of seven years.131 After
almost two years imprisonment, “President Carter commuted her
sentence.”132 Then, on January 20, 2001, President Clinton pardoned

118. Id.
119. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Linder, supra note 51.
124. Id.
125. Id. (“Fort offered his „velcro theory‟ for aimless, lost souls such at [sic] Hearst:
such persons, he said, float around in moral space and then find stuck to them the first
random ideology they bump into.”)
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
129. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
130. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. at 1072.
131. Id. (“On September 24, 1976, this Court sentenced petitioner to seven years on
Count I, for armed bank robbery, and to two years on Count II, for use of a weapon to
commit a felony, the sentences to be served concurrently.”) Id.
132. FBI Headline Archive, supra note 95.
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Patricia Hearst.133
D.

The D.C. Sniper Case

Another high-profile case that involved the brainwashing defense is
commonly referred to as the D.C. sniper case.134 Although the defense
approached the brainwashing defense from a different angle, it also was
not successful. The facts are crucial to understand the use of the defense.
Lee Boyd Malvo was a fifteen-year-old boy from Jamaica. After being
abandoned by his mother, Muhammad, a retired army veteran, brought
Malvo from Jamaica to the United States in 2001. This is when the
indoctrination process began.135 In the United States, “Muhammad filled
the teen‟s head with visions of an impending race war and trained Malvo
in marksmanship.”136 Malvo learned how to use “an AK47, a 270 rifle,
and a 306 rifle.”137 In addition, “[h]e isolated Malvo, steeped him to his
own idiosyncratic, vitriolic brand of Islam and imposed a strict diet and
exercise regimen on his „adopted‟ son.”138 For about a month,
Muhammad and Malvo drove around the D.C. area and shot thirteen
people, from the trunk of a car, leaving ten dead.139 Specifically, Malvo
was charged with killing FBI analyst Linda Franklin “outside a Home
Depot in Falls Church, Virginia, on October 14, 2002.”140 Though not
proven, Muhammad and Malvo were also believed to be involved with
shootings in other states, such as Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, Arizona,
and Washington.141
Malvo‟s defense counsel followed the unusual path of Hearst‟s
counsel and claimed that Malvo had been brainwashed by Muhammad.142
133. Linder, supra note 51.
134. Muhammad v. State, 934 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
135. Id. See also Carlin Flora, The Brainwashing Defense, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec.
9, 2003, http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-20031209-000001.html.
136. Flora, supra note 135.
137. Muhammad, 934 A.2d at 1077.
138. Flora, supra note 135.
139. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, CNN LAW CENTER, May 5,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/10/sniper.malvo/index.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2009).
140. Id.
141. Malvo Gets Life Sentence in Sniper Killing, CNN LAW CENTER, Oct. 27, 2004,
http://111.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/26/malvo.plea/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
142. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, supra note 139. See also
Oswald v. Bertrand, where, in a murder trial, a son unsuccessfully pleaded “that he was
brainwashed by his father into committing the crimes.” 374 F.3d 475, 482 (7th Cir.
2004). The court, however, ruled that:
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Instead of associating brainwashing with the duress defense, Malvo‟s
counsel related it to the insanity defense. Experts at trial compared the
teenage boy to a child soldier or a cult member.143 For instance, the
relationship between Malvo and Muhammad was equated to the
relationship between a cult member and a cult leader or a child soldier
and a warlord.144 These experts concluded that, as a result, “Malvo lost
all sense of morality, all sense of identity, and became little more than an
extension of Mr. Muhammad [sic] ego.”145 Furthermore, Dr. Neil
Blumberg, a forensic psychiatrist, testified at trial that “Mr. Muhammad
trained Mr. Malvo to be a soldier „in his war against America . . . .‟”146
The defense counsel‟s experts also testified to the brainwashing
process that took place. They explained that Malvo “suffered from
dissociative disorder.”147 According to Dr. Blumberg and other experts,
Muhammad used indoctrination “techniques . . . including isolating
[Malvo], controlling his diet and sleep, forcing him to watch violent
videos, training him to use guns and teaching him a violent brand of
Islam and black separatism.”148 Muhammad‟s brainwashing completely
“broke down [Malvo‟s] already shaky sense of self and made him unable
to resist Mr. Muhammad‟s commands.”149 Moreover, Malvo reached the
breaking point that led to his “identity crisis” and loss of who he was.150
He was merely Muhammad‟s puppet and his sense of right and wrong
was blurred.151 However, the defense counsel‟s experts admitted that

[i]f brainwashing is just a form . . . of the defense of coercion, it is
barred by the conspirator exception; if brainwashing is a separate
defense, it probably is not recognized by the law; and if it is merely
an effort to show that Oswald was somehow incapable of forming an
intent to kill, it would be highly unlikely to persuade a jury.
Id. (citation omitted).
143. Dao, supra note 4.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (stating that Muhammad took advantage of “Malvo‟s hunger for a father
figure . . . .”).
147. Id. Dissociative disorder means that the indoctrination “turned Malvo into an
automaton-victim, who could neither resist nor sanely understand the nature of his acts.”
EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 190 (Mark Costanzo et al., eds.,
2006).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Layton, supra note 23.
151. Dao, supra note 4.
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Malvo “was clinically depressed, even suicidal.”152
The prosecution focused on Malvo‟s suicidal notions and argued
that suicide was “evidence that he knew that those plans were horribly
wrong.”153 Additionally, the prosecution‟s experts concluded that Malvo
knew that what he was doing was wrong. The experts rather equated
Malvo‟s “sniper missions” with depraved indifference murder and
thought that his childhood experiences of “neglect and abuse” could not
be considered an excuse for his actions.154 Besides denying that Malvo
had an impaired mind, the prosecution also focused on Malvo‟s
voluntary actions. The prosecution claimed that “Malvo voluntarily
chose to be with Mr. Muhammad, that the so-called indoctrination lasted
just a few weeks and could not have completely impaired his faculties
and that he was predisposed toward antisocial behavior.”155
As in many insanity cases, the jury also rejected the defense
counsel‟s brainwashing theory. The jury did not believe that Muhammad
had indoctrinated Malvo to the point that he could not distinguish
between right and wrong.156 As a result, the jury found Malvo guilty of
murder and Malvo received a life sentence.157 Following this trial,
Malvo entered a guilty plea for the killings in Virginia and Montgomery
County, Maryland.158 In addition, he agreed to cooperate with the
prosecution and testify against Muhammad at trial.159
III. The Brainwashing Defense Should Be Adopted into the
Model Penal Code Under the Insanity Defense
The idea that certain acts should be criminalized and punished
mirrors our society‟s demand for certain acceptable behavioral
standards.160 In our society, this decision has long been one of moral
character.161 The public‟s reaction to the outcome in the Hearst trial
152. Id.
153. Id. (“Mr. Malvo has on several occasions expressed revulsion or reservations
about Mr. Muhammad‟s violent plans . . . .”).
154. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, supra note 139.
155. Dao, supra note 4.
156. Ahlers, supra note 12.
157. Id.
158. Muhammad v. State, 934 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). Malvo
pled guilty to first-degree murder and was “sentenced to six consecutive life sentences
without the possibility of parole.” Id.
159. Id.
160. Delgado, supra note 1, at n.30.
161. Id. “The indoctrination desensitized Mr. Malvo to violence . . . .” Dao, supra
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demonstrates this notion. For example, in 1975, before all of the details
of Hearst‟s kidnapping and “brainwashing” were disclosed, “about
ninety percent of the general public believed that Patricia Hearst was
guilty and should be sentenced to prison.”162 Yet, after more details were
released, “nearly one-half of the public favored parole or pardon.”163
The public‟s view of Hearst‟s situation showed that morally, it felt that
Hearst‟s action should be excused. Especially after Hearst‟s kidnappers
pleaded guilty to the kidnapping, the public realized that “Hearst was
blameless” for becoming part of the SLA.164
Nevertheless, the overwhelming evidence at trial against Hearst‟s
theory of brainwashing was evident. Hearst‟s lawyers could not prove
that she was still under duress while she committed the crime. Though
her seven-year sentence was later pardoned, Hearst‟s strategy of placing
brainwashing under the duress defense did not play out in her favor. The
lawyers in the D.C. sniper case learned from the Hearst outcome and
tried a different strategy. “By trying to equate brainwashing with mental
illness, Mr. Malvo‟s lawyers have pushed the boundaries of the insanity
defense into a gray area where precedents are few and obstacles to
winning an acquittal are high, legal experts said.”165
Although the psychological community is not in agreement about
whether brainwashing is a mental disease or defect, it has recognized the
Stockholm Syndrome.
Therefore, as previously mentioned,
brainwashing should be categorized as a mental disease as well. The
idea set forth in the D.C. sniper case shows that brainwashed people
cannot distinguish between right and wrong. A brainwashed defendant
may testify that, at the time he committed the crime, he “„felt‟ the
decision to be his own” and that “he was acting of his own free will.”166
As a result, the mens rea of the brainwashed person becomes irrelevant.
Though the defendant is conscious of what he is doing, he thinks he is
doing the right thing. Consequently, brainwashing should be placed
under the insanity defense and not under the duress defense.

note 4.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Delgado, supra note 1, at n.31.
Id.
Id.
Dao, supra note 4.
Delgado, supra note 1, at 26.
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Proposed Elements for the Brainwashing Defense

The elements of the insanity defense include “[a] mental disease or
defect” and the lack of “substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.”167 The brainwashing elements are similar.
However, contrary to the insanity defense, brainwashing must be done by
an external force.
The defendant must be associated with an
indoctrinator. For example, through emotional or physical control, the
indoctrinator must substantially impair the defendant‟s mind. This
would satisfy the mental disease or defect element of the insanity
defense. Then, the defendant must be acting in furtherance of the
indoctrinator‟s vision; the defendant‟s actions must be aligned with the
goal of the indoctrinator. As a result, the defendant knowingly commits
the offense; however, he cannot comprehend that his act was wrong.
Consequently, the proposed Model Penal Code provision for
brainwashing would read as follows: “(1) A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of a mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct. . .;”168 (2) A mental disease or
defect must be the result of an indoctrinator substantially impairing a
person‟s mind; and (3) A person is acting in furtherance of the
indoctrinator‟s vision and goals.
B.

Criticism of the Brainwashing Defense

The brainwashing defense has yet to be successful in court.
Naturally, judges are hesitant to admit evidence in support of
brainwashing because it is not a recognized defense. By introducing
brainwashing under the duress and insanity defenses, brainwashing
evidence has been presented in courts. Some critics voice their concern
of too much psychiatric influence in the American Criminal Justice
System.169 In addition to the “„anti-psychiatry‟ school,”170 critics are
troubled with the notion that brainwashing is not accepted as a scientific
theory by, for example, the American Psychological Association.171

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001).
Id.
Delgado, supra note 1, at 23-24.
Id.
See Introvigne, supra note 34.
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Nevertheless, brainwashing should stand as a valid legal concept without
the scientific basis because the insanity defense was also incorporated
into law well “before a universally accepted scientific model was
available.”172 Professor Delgado therefore concludes “that the scientific
certainty has never been essential to the establishment of a legal
defense.”173 Now, years after the defense has been successfully used in
the courtroom, even the American Psychological Association and the
American Psychiatric Association support the insanity defense as long as
the defendant receives adequate treatment and society is not endangered
if the defendant is let free.174 Furthermore, research has shown that
“[m]embers of the lay public, who are potential jurors, hold beliefs that
brainwashing is an effective psychological process . . . .”175 The first
step is to have the general public recognize that brainwashing exists.
The legal community should be next in recognizing brainwashing, even
if the scientific community has not done so. As a result, the lack of
scientific recognition of brainwashing should not be an excuse in
refusing to incorporate the brainwashing defense. Perhaps the scientific
community would even follow the legal example and acknowledge
brainwashing as a scientific theory.
Another criticism to the brainwashing defense is the role of the
defendant‟s predisposition. In the legal context, the role of a person‟s
predisposition has not been resolved.176 Experts in both the Hearst and
172. Delgado, supra note 1, at 24 (“Such a requirement is not realistic . . . [and] not
observed in connection with the development of other mental defenses . . . .”).
173. Id.
174. THINKING ABOUT THE INSANITY DEFENSE 10-11 (Ellsworth Lapham Fersch ed.,
2005).
175. Warburton, supra note 3, at 79 (quoting John S. DeWitt et al., Novel Scientific
Evidence and Controversial Cases: A Social Psychological Examination, 21 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
One survey of 383 randomly-drawn registered voters revealed that
over three-quarters of those questioned said they believed
brainwashing occurs. In response to the statement “A person can be
brainwashed, even if they are not actually held captive against their
will,” nearly seventy-eight percent said they agreed, while twentyone percent disagreed.
Also, about thirty percent of those
interviewed agreed with the statement “Brainwashing is required to
make someone join a religious cult.”
John S. DeWitt et al., Novel Scientific Evidence and Controversial Cases: A Social
Psychological Examination, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 7 (1997).
176. James T. Richardson, “Brainwashing” Claims and Minority Religions Outside
the United States: Cultural Diffusion of a Questionable Concept in the Legal Arena, 1996
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 873, 879 (1996).
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D.C. sniper cases touched upon the defendant‟s predisposition.
Proponents of brainwashing sometimes ignore that some people have
“predisposing characteristics.”177 In Hearst, the prosecution brought
forth evidence that Hearst was predisposed to joining the SLA and even
found the group appealing.178 In the D.C. sniper case, the prosecution
touched upon Malvo‟s abusive childhood and his mother‟s abandonment
as a reason for following Muhammad as his role model.179 The extreme
view on predisposition is the “„psychoanalytical‟ objection.”180 The
theory entails that “even an intense thought reform cannot convert a lawabiding citizen into an outlaw.”181 Without some sort of predisposition, a
person would not be prone to brainwashing.182 Proponents of the
“psychoanalytical objection” do not believe in brainwashing because, in
their view, a person can only be brainwashed when he or she has been
predisposed to that kind of behavior. However, there are also those
experts that believe that anyone can be brainwashed.183 It should be up
to a jury to decide what theory to believe and how much of a defendant‟s
actions are attributable to predisposing characteristics. In the end, the
jury must decide whether or not a defendant was truly brainwashed.
The main criticism of the brainwashing defense is that it is
ineffective. Since it is so difficult to prove that a person has been
brainwashed, the defense is not used often at trial. Ineffectiveness and
rare usage are weak arguments because the insanity defense brings about
the same qualities. Acknowledging that “[b]rainwashing is poised to
take its place within the legal justice system,” the brainwashing theory
has been proposed as a mitigating factor instead of a complete defense.184
The idea is that, despite the failure of the defense “during the
guilt/innocence phase,” a jury can take into account the same factors
during the “sentencing phase” for mitigation purposes.185 The same
approach has been used in insanity cases. In several jurisdictions juries
are able to consider mitigating factors “such as psychological

177. Id.
178. Linder, supra note 51.
179. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, supra note 139.
180. Delgado, supra note 1, at 24.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 24-25.
183. Id. at 25 (“[T]hose psychologists and psychiatrists who are most intimately
familiar with thought reform believe that virtually everyone can be induced to behave
criminally if subjected to intensive thought reform in a totally controlled environment.”).
184. See Warburton, supra note 3, at 97.
185. Id. at 88-96.
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impairment;”186 factors such as this may work to “reduce the offender‟s
culpability but do[ ] not meet the threshold for acquittal under an insanity
defense.”187 This is especially prevalent in capital offense cases.188 For
example, the jury spared Malvo from the death sentence despite his
admission to the heinous crimes. Although this is a step in the right
direction, it undermines the full capability of the brainwashing defense.
Insanity has been a valid defense for many decades despite its low
success rate and rare usage. Thus, brainwashing should be available as a
complete exculpating defense and, if the threshold cannot be met, should
naturally be considered as a mitigating factor. It is obvious that States
that do not acknowledge the insanity defense should not acknowledge the
brainwashing defense either. In all other States, however, there is no
valid reason not to adopt the brainwashing defense.
IV. Conclusion
Despite some of the valid criticisms, the brainwashing defense
should be adopted into the Model Penal Code and associated with the
insanity defense for two reasons. First, brainwashing can be validly
placed within the ABA‟s definition of a mental disease or defect.
Second, it should not be associated with the duress defense. Whereas
brainwashed defendants commit crimes even after the initial stage of
coercion, under the duress defense, coercion and the threat of bodily
harm must be imminent.
Brainwashing can be a complete defense to a crime and should not
be regarded merely as a mitigating factor. Rather than viewing the
186. Robert F. Schopp, Two-Edged Swords, Dangerousness, and Expert Testimony
in Capital Sentencing, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 83 (2006).
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(b), (f), (g) (2001). The mitigating
circumstances are:
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
...
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of
another person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a
result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.
Id.
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brainwashed person as a perpetrator, he should be viewed as the victim
because the indoctrinator completely controlled the person‟s mind and,
therefore, his actions. The goal of the brainwashing defense should be
the rehabilitation of the defendant. If necessary, rehabilitation should
take place in an institution. Most states already have laws in existence
that will determine whether or not a defendant must be institutionalized.
As in insanity cases, rehabilitation is emphasized because, under the
theories of punishment, deterrence would not be beneficial.
As previously mentioned, the proposed elements for the
brainwashing defense that must be established are: “(1) A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of a mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity . . . to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct;. . . (2) A mental
disease or defect must be the result of an indoctrinator substantially
impairing a person‟s mind; and (3) A person is acting in furtherance of
the indoctrinator‟s vision and goals.”189 Though it is a stringent test to
meet, it is possible. In the end, although it is the jury‟s decision whom to
believe, the defendant should have the option to plead “not guilty” by
reason of brainwashing.

189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001).
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